Oblivious polynomial evaluation is a protocol involving two parties, a sender whose input is a polynomial P , and a receiver whose input is a value α. At the end of the protocol the receiver learns P (α) and the sender learns nothing. We describe efficient constructions for this protocol, which are based on new intractability assumptions that are closely related to noisy polynomial reconstruction. Oblivious polynomial evaluation can be used as a primitive in many applications. We describe several such applications, including protocols for private comparison of data, for mutually authenticated key exchange based on (possibly weak) passwords, and for anonymous coupons.
Introduction
A secure computation protocol for a function f (·, ·) allows two parties, a receiver who knows x and a sender who knows y, to jointly compute the value of f (x, y) in a way that does not reveal to each side more information than can be deduced from f (x, y). The fact that for every polynomially computable function f (·, ·) there exists such a (polynomially computable) protocol is one of the most remarkable achievements of research in foundations of cryptography. However, the resulting protocols are often not as efficient as one would desire, since the number of cryptographic operations that should be performed is proportional to the size of the circuit computing f (x, y) [59] . Even for relatively simple functions this may be prohibitively expensive. It is therefore interesting to investigate for which functions it is possible to come up with a protocol that does not emulate a circuit computing the function.
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation
In the Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) problem the input of the sender is a polynomial P of degree k over some field F. The receiver can get the value P (x) for any element x ∈ F without learning anything else about the polynomial P and without revealing to the sender any information about x (for the precise definition of learning and information see Section 1.2). This problem has not been investigated so far; we find it to be a useful primitive. For example, as it can act as a cheap replacement for pseudo-random functions in case only k-wise independence is needed.
Strongly polynomial overhead: The overhead of an algorithm is strongly polynomial if it is bounded by a polynomial function of the number of data items in the input, rather than the size of the input values (e.g. the number of bits of numerical input values). The issue of finding protocols for oblivious polynomial evaluation whose overhead does not depend on the field size, might be regarded as being the equivalent of searching for strongly polynomial algorithms in combinatorial optimization (e.g. for linear programming). In the context of cryptographic protocols we measure the overhead in terms of the number of public key operations (i.e. operations based on trapdoor functions, or similar operations) with a specific security parameter, where the size of the inputs to the public key operations is linear in the security parameter. (In the context of this paper, we usually only measure the number of invocations of a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol.) Counting only public key operations is justified since the overhead of public key operations depends on the length of their inputs, and is greater by orders of magnitude than the overhead of symmetric key operations (i.e. operations based on one-way functions).
We therefore say that a cryptographic protocol is strongly polynomial if the following two properties hold: (1) the number of public key operations performed by the protocol is bounded by a polynomial function of a security parameter and of the number of inputs (but not their size), and (2) the length of the inputs to the public key operations is linear in the security parameter. Note that the number of symmetric key operations that the protocol performs can be polynomial in the size of its inputs.
Oblivious polynomial evaluation can be implemented using general protocols for secure two-party computation [59] . However, as was mentioned above, these protocols operate on a binary circuit that computes the function and are not strongly polynomial, as the number of oblivious transfers they use is at least linear in log F, where F is the field over which the polynomial is defined. A different construction of oblivious polynomial evaluation can be based on using homomorphic encryption (e.g., Paillier's encryption system [54] ). That construction, too, is not strongly polynomial, as the size of the input to the homomorphic encryption function must be as long as the receiver's input in the OPE protocol. In contrast, the number of oblivious transfers used by the protocols presented in this paper does not depend on the size of the underlying field: The length of the items transferred in the oblivious transfer protocols is of size log |F|, but they require only O(1) public key operations per transfer. Namely, if log |F| is longer than the length of the input of the OT protocol, then the items to be transferred in the OT protocol are encrypted using random keys, and the corresponding keys are transferred in the actual OT protocol.
Moreover, our protocols can be readily applied to oblivious computation of g P (x) , where P is a polynomial, with no increase in their overhead, as described in Section 4.1. In comparison, the binary circuits that evaluate this function must compute exponentiations and are very large, and the overhead of the resulting secure protocols is high. (Protocols based on homomorphic encryption, however, can compute g P (x) without increasing their overhead.) Oblivious evaluation of g P (x) yields k-wise independent outputs that might be useful for distributed implementations of some public key operations.
The noisy polynomial reconstruction problem: The protocols we describe are based on intractability assumptions related to the noisy polynomial reconstruction problem.
While being related to other computational problems, this problem has not been used before as an intractability assumptions in a cryptographic protocol. Section 2 describes in detail the assumptions and the background. Interestingly, Kiayias and Yung designed different cryptographic primitives which are based on variants of the noisy polynomial reconstruction problem [37, 38] .
Overhead independent of the degree of the polynomial: We describe a protocol (Protocol 3.4) whose computational overhead (as measured by the number of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers that are computed) is independent of the degree of the polynomial. I.e., for any degree d, the number of oblivious transfers that are required for an oblivious evaluation of a polynomial of degree d is the same as for a linear polynomial. (Of course, the total computation overhead of the evaluation of the polynomial depends on the degree of the polynomial, but the number of public key operations is independent of the degree.)
Applications: We envision two types of applications for oblivious polynomial evaluation. One is whenever k-wise independence can replace full independence or pseudorandomness (i.e. oblivious evaluation of a pseudo-random function, as in [52] ). Such property is required, for example, for the application of constructing anonymous coupons that enable anonymous usage of limited resources (e.g., for constructing an anonymous complaint box). The other type of applications uses OPE for comparing information without leaking it, or preserving anonymity when the receiver must compute the value of a polynomial at a certain point. Applications of this nature include a protocol that allows reliable and privacy preserving metering (described in Section 4.3), a method for distributed generation of RSA keys, designed by Gilboa [27] , and a protocol for private computation of the ID3 data mining algorithms [42] (in that case the polynomial is used for a Taylor approximation of the logarithm function).
Correctness and Security Definitions
We now get to the delicate business of defining the security of oblivious polynomial evaluation. OPE requires privacy for both receiver and sender. Namely, in an OPE protocol neither party learns anything more than is defined by the OPE functionality. The strongest way of formalizing this notion and ensuring simple composability of the protocols is through the definition of secure two-party computation (see, e.g., Goldreich [30] ) and papers on universal composability, e.g. [11, 12] ). However, this definition is rather complex, while there are many applications that do not require the full power of the general definition and could use "non-ideal" protocols. We therefore prefer to use a relaxed definition for OPE, which ensures privacy for both parties but does not require the sender to commit to its input (i.e., to commit to the polynomial P ). We call this definition private computation. The definition of private computation is relevant also to the case of malicious parties (and is therefore stronger than a definition for the semi-honest case only). It preserves the privacy of the clients, but does not require one to simulate the joint distribution of the view of a malicious sender and the output of an honest receiver, as is required by the general definition of secure computation.
We claim that this relaxation is justified by efficiency considerations, in particular when constructing specific OPE protocols rather than black-box reductions of OPE to other primitives. Furthermore, the definition of private computation is standard for related primitives such as oblivious transfer [56, 22, 51] or PIR [14, 40] (note that we present a reduction of OPE to oblivious transfer). Note also that the definition of private computation is equivalent to the definition of secure computation in the case of semi-honest parties. Furthermore, we deal with a receiver-sender (a.k.a. client-server) scenario, where only one party, the receiver, has an output in the protocol. Therefore, the two definitions are equivalent with respect to a malicious client, as there is no issue of simulating the joint distribution of the client's view and the server's output.
The requirements of a private OPE protocol can be divided into correctness, receiver privacy, and server privacy. Let us first define these properties independently and then define a private OPE protocol as a protocol satisfying these definitions. In the definitions, the running time of polynomial time algorithms is polynomial in the size of their inputs, as well as in the log |F|, where F is the field in which the polynomial P is defined, and in a security parameter k. (Note that the length of representations of elements in F must be polynomial in the security parameter since otherwise the cryptographic operations might be insecure given adversaries with poly-log |F| running time.) We don't require in the definitions themselves that the number of public-key operations is independent of F. To simplify the notation we also omit any reference to auxiliary inputs.
We first define the input and output for the functionality of oblivious polynomial evaluation, as a two party protocol run between a receiver and a sender over a field F.
• Input -Receiver: an input x ∈ F.
-Sender: A polynomial P defined over F.
• Output -Receiver: P (x).
-Sender: nothing. Definition 1.1 (Correctness, or Functionality) At the end of the protocol the receiver obtains the output of the OPE functionality, namely P (x).
The definition of the receiver's privacy is simplified by the fact that the sender gets no output. It is as follows: Definition 1.2 (Receiver's privacy -indistinguishability) For any probabilistic polynomial time B executing the sender's part, for any x and x in F, the views that B sees in case the receiver's input is x and in case the receiver's input is x are computationally indistinguishable.
The definition of sender's privacy is a bit trickier, since the receiver (or whatever machine that is substituted for her part) obtains some information, and we want to say that the receiver does not get more or different information than she should. We compare the protocol to the ideal implementation. In the ideal implementation there is a trusted third party Charlie, which gets the sender's polynomial P and the receiver's request x and gives P (x) to the receiver. The privacy requirement is that the protocol does not leak to the receiver more information than in the ideal implementation. Note that the definition of receiver privacy does not preclude the sender from cheating by using a polynomial of degree higher than the degree of P (and therefore it might not be possible to extract from the sender a degree k polynomial.) We do not require that the sender be committed to single polynomial, and that the receiver could verify that the value she receives corresponds to this polynomial. Our construction allows such cheating; however, in many applications (including the ones described in this paper) this is immaterial.
As a side note we observe that a possible approach for ensuring correctness could use the verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes of Feldman and of Pedersen [24, 55] , which let the sender commit to a single polynomial P before engaging in the OPE protocol. Since two polynomials of degree d agree in at most d locations, an OPE invocation in which the sender lets the user evaluate a different polynomial P of the same degree is revealed with probability 1 − d/|F| by a receiver that evaluates the polynomial at a random point. This approach does not work, however, if the sender has some information about the distribution of points in which the user might compute P .
Related Work

Oblivious transfer
The basic cryptographic primitive that is used by the protocols for oblivious polynomial evaluation is oblivious transfer. The notion of 1-out-2 oblivious transfer was suggested by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [22] as a generalization of Rabin's "oblivious transfer" (OT) [56] . A protocol for 1-out-of-2 OT involves a sender, which has two inputs x 0 and x 1 , and a receiver whose input is a single bit, b ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol the receiver learns x b and nothing about x 1−b , while the sender learns nothing about b.
For a discussion of OT see Goldreich [30] . 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer was introduced by Brassard, Crépeau and Robert [9, 10] under the name ANDOS (all or nothing disclosure of secrets). They used information theoretic reductions to construct 1-out-of-N protocols from N − 1 invocations of a 1-out-of-2 protocol (it was later shown that such reductions must use at least Ω(N ) invocations of 1-out-of-2 OT in order to preserve the information theoretic security [18] ). Goldreich and Vainish [32] and Kilian [39] showed that oblivious transfer enables general secure two-party computation, with no additional assumptions (with security against semi-honest and malicious adversaries, respectively).
Constructions of oblivious transfer protocols can be based on physical assumptions, such as the use of a noisy channel (see, e.g., [16] ), and on computational assumptions. Constructions based on computational assumptions can be divided to different categories, according to the security definitions that they satisfy:
• OT protocols which provide security in the semi-honest model. These include basic protocols based on the Even-Goldreich-Lempel (EGL) paradigm [22] , which are based on using a public key encryption system that has the additional property that the distribution of ciphertexts is independent of the encryption key. In these protocols the receiver sends two encryption keys P K 0 and P K 1 , while knowing only a single decryption key, corresponding to P K b . The sender encrypts x 0 using the key P K 0 , and encrypts x 1 using the key P K 1 . The receiver then decrypts x b but cannot decrypt x 1−b . Protocols based on this paradigm include the construction suggested by Bellare and Micali [5] , and generic constructions based on the existence of trapdoor permutations. These protocols can be made secure with respect to malicious parties if we add zero-knowledge proofs in which the parties prove that they follow the protocol. If the zero-knowledge proofs enable extraction then the protocols are simulatable, but only for a single invocation at a time (rather than for parallel or concurrent invocations of the protocol).
• OT protocols which provide information-theoretic security for the sender with respect to a corrupt receiver, and computational security for the receiver (e.g. the two round protocols of [50, 1, 58] ). Although these protocols provide information-theoretic security, they do not enable to extract the receiver's input. Therefore they do not enable easy simulation of the output that is obtained by the receiver.
• Fully simulatable OT protocols, in particular for parallel or concurrent invocations. These include the concurrent OT protocol of [25] (which assumes that the inputs are independent), the universally composable protocols of [12] , and the universally composable committed OT of [26] .
• Protocols based on the random oracle model. In this model it is possible to design very efficient protocols based on the EGL or the Bellare-Micali paradigms. These protocols are secure against malicious parties and fully simulatable. Their security relies, however, on the random oracle model.
The OPE constructions described in this paper can be based on oblivious transfer protocols from any of these categories (of course, the security depends on the security of the oblivious transfer protocol). Our work uses the 1-out-of-N and k-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocols described in [51] . These protocol are based on efficient computationally secure reductions to 1-outof-2 oblivious transfer. A 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer is reduced to log N invocations of 1-out-of-2 OT, and the k-out-of-N protocol is considerably more efficient than k repetitions of 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer. Furthermore, more recent constructions [50] reduce the amortized overhead of oblivious transfer, if multiple invocations of this protocol should be run (as is the case in the OPE constructions). A direct implementation of 1-out-of-N OT, e.g., by the protocols which provide information theoretic security for the sender [50, 1, 58] , is quite efficient for the receiver which has to do only O(1) work, while the sender has to perform O(N ) exponentiations.
It was recently shown how to extend oblivious transfer in the sense that two parties can execute a large number of OTs (a number polynomial in k, where k is a security parameter of a pseudo-random function), at the cost of running only k OTs and executing additional invocations of symmetric cryptographic functions for every OT [35] (this is an efficient realization of a generic construction of Beaver [3] ). the security of this construction is based on a non-standard assumption (or alternatively on the random oracle assumption), and security against malicious parties is obtained using a cut-and-choose method that involves running multiple invocations of the system.
In our work we measure the computational overhead by the number of OTs that are executed by the parties. The use of this criteria makes sense since all other operations are either arithmetic or are symmetric crypto operations, which are considerably more efficient. It is preferable to minimize the number of OT operations even given the recent work on extending oblivious transfer, since that construction depends on a new assumption, involves some additional constants, and requires a cut-and-choose solution against malicious parties. We present a protocol that uses a minimal number of OTs in the sense that this number is independent of the size of the field and of the degree of the polynomial. We assume that each 1-out-of-2 OT operation is atomic and can accommodate an input of arbitrary size (this is justified since the OT can be used to transfer one of two keys whose length is equal to the security parameter, and these keys can be used to encrypt each of the two inputs, which can be of arbitrary size).
Secure two-party computation
The idea of secure two-party computation was introduced by Yao [59] . His construction enables one party, the sender, to define a function F and enable another party, the receiver, to compute the value of F at a single point x, without learning anything else about F and without disclosing to the sender any information about x. The construction is based on describing F as a binary circuit, and evaluating the circuit. Its computational overhead is composed of running an oblivious transfer protocol for every input wire of the circuit, and computing a pseudo-random function for every gate. The communication overhead is composed of sending a table, of size linear in the security parameter of the pseudorandom function, for every gate. The overhead, therefore, strongly depends on the size of the representation of F as a binary circuit. In the case of a polynomial of degree d this circuit should compute x d and its size is O(|x| 2 · log |d|). In particular, the size of the circuit depends on the size of the field over which the polynomial is defined. (It is also possible to construct a circuit that uses an FFT approach for computing x d . The size of this circuit, too, depends on the size of the field over which the polynomial is defined.)
In another generic construction, Naor and Nissim [47] show that any two-party protocol can be transformed into a secure protocol with the effect that a protocol with communication complexity of c bits is transformed to a secure protocol which performs c invocations of oblivious transfer (or SPIR) from a database of length 2 c . A simple (insecure) protocol for oblivious polynomial evaluation has a single round and a communication overhead of log |F| bits (the receiver simply sends x to the sender). Applying the Naor-Nissim transformation to this protocol results in a secure protocol that executes an OT/SPIR out of a table of |F| elements. Namely, the server constructs a table of |F| items, containing the value of P (x) for every x ∈ F. The receiver then reads a single entry of this table using OT or SPIR. This protocol is definitely not strongly polynomial as its overhead is linear in |F|.
Intractability Assumptions
This section contains definitions of two new pseudo-randomness assumptions. They are later used for constructing protocols for oblivious polynomial evaluation. The assumptions are closely related to the noisy polynomial reconstruction problem, or the list decoding problem of Reed-Solomon codes. We first describe this well-known problem, and then introduce the pseudo-randomness assumptions.
The Noisy Polynomial Reconstruction Problem
The noisy polynomial reconstruction problem is described by the following definition: Definition 2.1 (Polynomial reconstruction) Input: Integers k and t, and n points {(
, where x i , y i ∈ F. Output: Any univariate polynomial P of degree at most k such that P (x i ) = y i for at least
The noisy polynomial reconstruction problem is related to the list decoding problem, which is motivated by coding theory and was first defined by Elias [21] (and sometimes also termed as the bounded-distance decoding problem). The input to this problem is a received word, and the output is a list of all code words that are within some distance from the received word. For the case of Reed-Solomon codes the list decoding problem can be formulated as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Polynomial list reconstruction)
Input: Integers k and t, and n points {(
, where x i , y i ∈ F. Output: All univariate polynomials P of degree at most k such that P (x i ) = y i for at least
For given values of k and n, and in particular for a given message rate k/n, it is preferable to obtain solutions for minimal values of t. The classical algorithm of Berlekamp and Massey (see e.g. [46] ) solves the polynomial reconstruction problem in polynomial time for t ≥ n+k 2 (in this range there is a unique solution). Sudan [57] presented a polynomial algorithm that works if t ≥ √ 2kn, and later Guruswami and Sudan [34] presented a polynomial algorithm that solves the problem for t ≥ √ kn, and thus improves upon the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm for every value of the message rate k/n. (Later, Coppersmith and Sudan [15] showed an improved noisy interpolation algorithm which removes random errors applied to curves of the form x, p 1 (x), p 2 (x), . . . , p c (x) , where p 1 , . . . , p c are polynomials. We are interested in the case c = 1, for which this algorithm is not better than the GuruswamiSudan algorithm.)
The "polynomial list reconstruction" problem is defined as a worst case problem regarding the number of polynomials that might appear in the solution list. In other words, the definition requires that all polynomials within a given distance be listed. Goldreich et. al. [31] have shown that for t > √ kn the number of possible polynomials in the solution to the problem is bounded by a polynomial in n. We are more interested in the problem of finding just a single polynomial that fits t or more of the given n points, since our constructions use random instances for which it holds with high probability that the corresponding noisy polynomial reconstruction problem has a single solution.
We note that given an input to a noisy polynomial reconstruction problem it is possible to randomize it to obtain an input that corresponds to a random polynomial. Specifically, for parameters k and t and given n points {(x i , y i )} n i=1 the randomization is achieved by choosing a random polynomial R of degree k and constructing a new instance of the problem with input {(
. While this is by no means a reduction from the worst case problem to the average case (since it only randomizes the polynomial but not the noise), it might hint that solving the problem in the average case might not be much simpler than solving it in the worst case.
The Intractability Assumptions -Pseudo-randomness
We present two new intractability assumptions. The first assumption is equivalent to a conjecture that given a randomly chosen input to the polynomial list reconstruction problem the value of the polynomial at x = 0 is pseudo-random. The second assumption states that the value P (0) is pseudo-random even given some additional hints about the location of the values of P . Section 3 describes OPE protocols that are based on the assumptions.
The intractability assumptions depend on the following parameters:
• F, the field over which the polynomial is defined.
• k, the degree of the hidden polynomial.
• n, the number of correct values of the polynomial, which is also the number of queries made in the oblivious evaluation protocol. (This parameter corresponds to "t" in the definition of the polynomial list reconstruction problem, Definition 2.2. We change the notation to agree with the notation used later in this paper.)
• m, the expansion ratio (namely, the ratio between the total number of points and n).
(This parameter corresponds to n/t in Definition 2.2.)
Setting precise parameter sizes to satisfy the intractability assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper, and we therefore do not make any precise recommendations with regard to parameter sizes.
The first intractability assumption
This intractability assumption simply assumes that given an input to the polynomial list reconstruction problem, with all x i being distinct, the value of the polynomial at x = 0 is pseudo-random. I.e., it is infeasible to distinguish between two such inputs corresponding to polynomials with different values at x = 0. To define this more formally, we use the following notation: Let A k,α n,m denote the probability distribution of sets generated in the following way:
1. Pick a random polynomial P over F, of degree at most k, for which it holds that P (0) = α.
2. Generate nm random values x 1 , . . . , x nm in F subject to the constraint that all x i values are distinct and different from 0.
3. Choose a random subset S of n different indices in [1, nm] , and set y i = P (x i ) for all i ∈ S. For every i ∈ S set y i to be a random value in F.
Output the set
. The pseudo-randomness assumption is based on the notion of computationally indistinguishability, as defined by Goldreich in [29, page 104] . It sets the size of the parameters to be polynomial in a security parameter , and requires that the resulting probability ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.
Assumption 1 (First pseudo-randomness assumption) Let be a security parameter, and let n( ), m( ), k( ), F ( ) be polynomially bounded functions that define the parameters n, m, k and the size in bits of the representation of an element in the field F. Let A k,α n,m and A k,α n,m be random variables that are chosen according to the distributions A k,α n,m and A k,α n,m , respectively. Then it holds that for every α, α ∈ F the probability ensembles {A k,α n,m } and {A k,α n,m } are computationally indistinguishable for adversaries whose running time is polynomial in the security parameter .
Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1 is related to the assumption that polynomial list reconstruction is hard. Assumption 1 is stronger, since in addition to assuming that reconstructing the polynomial is hard, it assumes that all x i are distinct and that it is even hard to learn information about the value of the polynomial at 0. Assumption 1 is weaker than an assumption that states that it is hard to distinguish between any probability ensemble {A k,α n,m } and a probability ensemble that generates sets with the same number of random (x, y) values. If the latter assumption is true then so is Assumption 1. (Assume that Assumption 1 does not hold. Then there is a distinguisher such that the probability of its output being 1 given an input from {A k,α n,m } has a non-negligible difference from the probability of it having a 1 output given an input from {A k,α n,m }. The probability of a 1 output given an input from the "random" ensemble must have a nonnegligible difference from at least one of these two probabilities.) The converse might not be true. It might be that it is easy to distinguish between an input from the "random" ensemble and an input from {A k,α n,m }, but yet for all α values, the inputs from the different {A k,α n,m } ensembles are indistinguishable. The pseudo-randomness assumption is of course false for any choice of parameters for which the polynomial list reconstruction problem is easy, e.g. when m < n/k. (This corresponds to the number of correct points, n, being more than the square root of the total number of points, nm, times the degree of polynomial, k. This equation therefore agrees with the threshold for which the noisy polynomial problem is easy.) In the other direction, it is an open problem to find a reduction from the polynomial list reconstruction to the assumption.
The second intractability assumption
The second assumption states that given n sets with m points in every set, such that a polynomial P agrees with at least one point in each set, the value of P (0) is pseudorandom. Namely, the total number of points, and the number of correct points, are as in Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1, but in addition there is a partition into sets and it is promised that the polynomial P agrees with at least one point in each set. It is hard to come up with a reduction to this assumption from Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1 since the reduction must map each of the n points of P into a different set. The new assumption seems stronger than Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1 since the problem is easier. Namely, the adversary is given an additional hint -the partition into sets containing at least one correct value of the polynomial.
The definition of the assumption uses the following notation. Let C k,α n,m denote the probability distribution of sets generated in the following way:
4. Partition the nm (x i , y i ) pairs to n random subsets subject to the following constraints:
• The subsets are disjoint.
• Each subset contains exactly one pair whose index is in S (and therefore for this pair it holds that y i = P (x i )).
• Each subset contains exactly m−1 pairs whose indices are not in S (and therefore have a random y i value).
Output the resulting subsets.
The intractability assumption says that for any α, α the two probability ensembles {C k,α n,m }, {C k,α n,m } are computationally indistinguishable. It depends on the parameters F, k, m, and n.
Assumption 2 (Second pseudo-randomness assumption) Let be a security parameter, and let n( ), m( ), k( ), F ( ) be polynomially bounded functions that define the parameters n, m, k and the size in bits of a representation of an element in the field F. Let C k,α n,m and C k,α n,m be random variables that are chosen according to the distributions C k,α n,m and C k,α n,m , respectively. Then it holds that for every α, α ∈ F the probability ensembles {C k,α n,m } and {C k,α n,m } are computationally indistinguishable.
As with the Assumption 1 there is an easy reduction from the problem of breaking this pseudo-randomness assumption to the noisy polynomial reconstruction problem. In addition, if Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1 does not hold in the worst case, then Pseudorandomness Assumption 2 does not hold in the worst case (since any input for the latter can be transformed to an input for the first assumption by simply ignoring the partition into subsets). This reduction is also true in the average case: consider all sets generated by the distributions A k,α n,m and C k,α n,m subject to the constraint that no more than n points in a set agree with the polynomial P (the probability that this property does not hold for a specific set is at most n(m − 1)/|F|, which we consider to be negligible). Denote the resulting collections of sets asÂ k,α n,m andĈ k,α n,m . Then each of the sets inÂ k,α n,m is mapped to the same number of sets inĈ k,α n,m , and no two sets inÂ k,α n,m are mapped to the same set in C k,α n,m . Now, given a random set inĈ k,α n,m , removing the partition into subsets results in a set inÂ k,α n,m . Therefore, this procedure has the same probability of hitting any set inÂ k,α n,m . It is an interesting open problem to provide a reduction to Pseudo-randomness Assumption 2 from Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1, or from the polynomial reconstruction problem. The problem with designing such a reduction is that its output should comply with the input distribution of Pseudo-randomness Assumption 2, namely in each subset there should be (with high probability) a single value of the polynomial P .
A remark: The pseudo-randomness assumption that was used in an earlier version of this work [49] was broken by Bleinchenbacher and Nguyen [7] and by Boneh [8] . The assumption was similar to Pseudo-randomness Assumption 2, but with the additional requirement that in each subset of the sets generated by C k,α n,m all the points have the same x coordinate. This property enables to reduce this problem to an instance of the lattice shortest vector problem, and solve it using the LLL algorithm [41] . We remark that it is unknown how to employ this attack against Pseudo-randomness Assumption 2. Furthermore, the overhead of the oblivious evaluation scheme that is based on Pseudo-randomness Assumption 2 is not greater than that of the scheme that is based on the broken assumption.
Protocols for Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation
Basic protocols: This section describes protocols for oblivious evaluation of polynomials. We first describe a generic OPE protocol (Protocol 3.1), and then describe two instantiations of the generic protocol using each of the two pseudo-randomness assumptions (Protocols 3.2 and 3.3, respectively). These protocols provide privacy against semi-honest or malicious senders, and against semi-honest receivers. (Semi-honest parties follow the operation that they should take according to the protocol, but might try to deduce more information from the data they learn in the execution of the protocol. Malicious parties can behave arbitrarily.)
The protocols ensure that a malicious receiver learns at most a single linear equation of the coefficients of the polynomial, but this equation might not correspond to a legitimate value of the polynomial. We show that if the polynomial P that is evaluated is linear then the protocols are secure even against malicious receivers, since the linear equation always corresponds to a value of the polynomial.
Security against malicious receivers, and improved efficiency: We then describe Protocol 3.4 which is secure against malicious receivers. Furthermore, Protocol 3.4 (although a little more complicated conceptually) has computational overhead which is better than that of the previous protocols: The number of oblivious transfers is independent of the degree of the polynomial P and is equal to the number of oblivious transfers that are required in the case of a linear polynomial.
A Generic Protocol
All the protocols involve a receiver A and a sender B and have the following specifications:
• Input:
(To simplify the notation we denote by y the input to P .) -Receiver: a value α ∈ F.
• Output:
-Sender: nothing.
-Receiver: P (α).
• Protocol security parameters: m, k, which are discussed below.
At the end of the protocol the parties learn nothing but their specified outputs. The generic protocol (Protocol 3.1) is described in Figure 1 . It is based on the sender hiding P in a bivariate polynomial, and running oblivious transfer protocols with the receiver to reveal to her just enough information to enable the computation of P (α). (In this respect, the protocol is somewhat similar to the instance hiding construction of [4, 43] .) Protocol 3.1 (A generic protocol for oblivious polynomial evaluation)
1. The sender hides P in a bivariate polynomial: (see Figure 2 ) The sender generates a random masking polynomial
The parameter d equals the degree of P multiplied by the security parameter
The sender then defines a bivariate polynomial
for which it holds that ∀y Q(0, y) = P (y).
2. The receiver hides α in a univariate polynomial: (see Figure 3 ) The receiver chooses a random polynomial S of degree k, such that S(0) = α. The receiver's plan is to use the univariate polynomial R(x) = Q(x, S(x)) in order to learn P (α): it holds that R(0) = Q(0, S(0)) = P (S(0)) = P (α) and, therefore, if the receiver is able to interpolate R she can learn
3. The receiver learns points of R: The receiver learns d R + 1 values of the form x i , R(x i ) .
The receiver computes P (α):
The receiver uses the values of R that it learned to interpolate R(0) = P (α). Note that the protocol uses a polynomial Q(x, y) which is defined by d + d P + 1 coefficients only, whereas a random bivariate polynomial of the same degrees is defined by (d+1)(d P +1) coefficients. The only step that has to be further specified is Step 3, in which the receiver learns d R + 1 values of R. This is the only step that involves interaction between the two parties, and as such determines the overhead of the protocol. This step can be based on any of the pseudo-randomness assumptions. Below are descriptions of two protocols for oblivious polynomial computation in which Step 3 is based on each of the two pseudo-randomness assumptions.
Detailed Protocols
This section describes instantiations of Protocol 3.1 based on the two pseudo-randomness assumptions.
A protocol based on Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1
The first instantiation employs an n-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol (see e.g. [51] ) to let the receiver learn n values of R while hiding these values from the sender. (See • The receiver sets n = d R + 1 = d + 1 = kd P + 1 and chooses N = nm distinct random values x 1 , . . . , x N ∈ F, all different from 0.
• The receiver chooses a random set T of n indices 1 ≤ i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ≤ N . She then defines N values y i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The value y i is defined as S(x i ) if i is in T , and is a random value if F otherwise.
• The receiver sends the N points {(x i , y i )} N i=1 to the sender.
• The receiver and sender execute an n-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol, for the N values Q(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , Q(x N , y N ). (The receiver chooses to learn {Q(x i , y i )} i∈T .)
The correctness of the protocol is based on observing that the receiver can learn d R + 1 values of the polynomial R, and can, therefore, interpolate R and compute R(0) = P (α). We prove the security of the protocol in Section 3.3 below.
A protocol based on pseudo-randomness Assumption 2
The second protocol is based on using n sets of points, such that each set contains a point of the polynomial R. The receiver runs an independent oblivious transfer protocol for each set, in which it learns a value of R.
Protocol 3.3 (Oblivious polynomial evaluation based on assumption 2)
The protocol is the generic protocol (Protocol 3.1), where the third step is run as follows:
• The receiver sets n = d R + 1 = kd P + 1, defines N = nm and chooses N distinct random values x 1 , . . . , x N ∈ F, all different from 0.
• The receiver chooses at random a set T of n indices 1 ≤ i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ≤ N , subject to the constraint that (j − 1)m + 1 ≤ i j ≤ jm for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
• The receiver defines N values y i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The value y i is defined as S(x i ) if i is in T , and is random otherwise.
• The receiver partitions the N pairs {(x i , y i )} N i=1 into n subsets B 1 , . . . , B n , where subset B j contains the m pairs indexed (j − 1)m + 1 to jm. This means that each subset B j contains exactly one pair from T .
• The receiver sends the n subsets B 1 , . . . , B n to the sender.
• The receiver and sender execute n protocols of 1-out-of-m oblivious transfer, one for each subset. The protocol for subset B j enables the receiver to learn one of the values Q(x i , y i ) for the m points (x i , y i ) in B j . (The receiver should choose to learn Q(x i , y i ) for which y i = P (x i ).)
Properties of the protocols
Correctness: It is straightforward to verify that both protocols enable the receiver to obtain any value P (α) she desires. She can do this by choosing a polynomial S for which S(0) = α, learning d R + 1 values of R, and interpolating R(0) = P (α).
Complexity:
The main overhead of each the protocols, in terms of both computation and communication, is the overhead of the oblivious transfer stage, and depends on the degree of P and on the security parameters k and m. Namely, the overhead of each protocol is that of running the following primitives:
• Protocol 3.2 (based on Assumption 1): running a single invocation of (kd P + 1)-outof-[(kd P + 1) · m] oblivious transfer.
• Protocol 3.3 (based on Assumption 2): running (kd P + 1) invocations of 1-out-of-m oblivious transfer.
The actual overhead of the protocol depends on the value that is set to the parameter m, as a function of k and d P , in order for the relevant security assumption to hold (this value might be different in each of the protocols). It might seem that Protocol 3.3, which uses (kd P +1) invocations of 1-out-of-m oblivious transfer, is always inferior to Protocol 3.2, which uses a single invocation of (kd P + 1)-out-of-[(kd P + 1) · m] oblivious transfer. Also, the fact that in Protocol 3.3 each subset is known to contain a value of the polynomial S might make the task of attacking the receiver easier, and require the use of larger parameter m to ensure the security of the protocol. We describe both protocols since the choice of parameters k and m might be different in the two cases and result in Protocol 3.3 being the more efficient. Also, recent work on extending oblivious transfer [35] leads to more efficient implementation of multiple invocations of OT.
We note that the multiple invocations of the oblivious transfer protocol in Protocol 3.3 can be run in parallel. The protocol is secure if the specific oblivious transfer protocol which is used can be securely run in parallel with respect to the relevant adversary (i.e., with respect to either semi-honest or malicious adversaries).
A note on evaluating multiple polynomials with the same receiver input
The OPE protocols have a rather handy property, a single invocation of a protocol can be used to let the receiver compute the values of several polynomials at the same point x, with the same overhead (in terms of the number of oblivious transfers) as computing the value of a single polynomial. This can be done since the choices of the receiver in the OT protocols depends on her input x alone, and this input is the same in all invocations of the OPE protocol. The parallel invocation is done by the parties running a protocol in which the sender's input is n polynomials P 1 , . . . , P n , the receiver's input is x, and the receiver's output is P 1 (x), . . . , P n (x) . The sender defines appropriate polynomials Q 1 , . . . , Q n and in every step in which the sender transfers a single value Q(i, j) in the original protocol, he transfers n values Q 1 (i, j) , . . . , Q n (i, j) in the multi-polynomial protocol. Note that this variant ensures that the receiver computes the values of all the polynomials at the same point x. This variant of the protocol is used in Protocol 3.4 in Section 3.4, and is also used in [27] for distributed generation of RSA keys.
Security Analysis for Semi-honest Behavior
In order to prove the protocol to be secure it has to be shown that the privacy of both receiver and sender is preserved. These properties can be reduced to the pseudo-randomness assumptions (which are only needed to show the receiver's privacy), and to the security of the oblivious transfer protocols.
The receiver's privacy
The privacy goal of the receiver is to hide the value α = S(0) from the sender. We only need to show this for a semi-honest sender, since the protocol includes a single message from the receiver to the sender, which does not depend on the operation of the sender (and our security definition does not require to simulate the output of the receiver together with the view of the sender). This property is guaranteed by the pseudo-randomness assumptions stated in Section 2.2. We prove this result for Protocol 3.2, based on Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1. The proof for Protocol 3.3 is identical and is based on Pseudo-randomness Assumption 2.
Theorem 3.1 If the sender can distinguish between two different inputs of the receiver in Protocol 3.2, then either the oblivious transfer protocol does not provide privacy for the receiver, or Pseudo-randomness Assumption 1 (Definition 1) does not hold (namely, there is a distinguisher between the two probability ensembles stated in the assumption).
Proof: The sender's view in the protocol contains the set of points that is given to him by the receiver, and the interaction between the two parties in the oblivious transfer protocol. Each instance of the sender's view therefore contains nm points, and in addition his view in an oblivious transfer protocol in which the receiver chooses to learn values associated with a set of n of the nm points.
Let α 0 , α 1 be any two values in F. Consider the following probability distributions of instances of the sender's view in the protocol.
• S OT,0 : The set of nm points is chosen randomly from A k,α 0 n,m . The interaction of the receiver in the oblivious transfer protocol corresponds to her choosing to learn the n correct points of the polynomial among the nm points.
• S OT,1 : Similar to S OT,0 with the only difference being that the set of nm points is chosen randomly from A k,α 1 n,m .
• S R,0 : The set of nm points is chosen randomly from A k,α 0 n,m . The interaction of the receiver in the oblivious transfer protocol corresponds to her choosing to learn n points sampled at random from the set of nm points.
• S R,1 : Similar to S R,0 , with the only difference being that the set of nm points is chosen randomly from A k,α 1 n,m .
We would like to show that no algorithm D α 0 ,α 1 run by the sender can distinguish between an input sampled from S OT,0 and an input sampled from S OT,1 . Define D OT,0 as the probability that the output of D α 0 ,α 1 is 1 given an input sampled from S OT,0 . Similarly, define D OT,1 , D R,0 and D R,1 . It holds that If option 2 occurs then we have a distinguisher between inputs sampled from A k,α 0 n,m and from A k,α 1 n,m . The distinguisher operates by receiving its input, adding to it an interaction for the oblivious transfer protocol in which the receiver learns a random set of n values, and forwarding the combined input to D α 0 ,α 1 . Since |D R,0 − D R,1 | is non-negligible there will be a non-negligible difference between the output being 1 given inputs from the two distributions. 2
The sender's privacy -the case of a semi-honest receiver
We first assume a semi-honest receiver whose operation follows the behavior that it should take according to the protocol. It is a good model for the case of a truthful party that executes the protocol, but at a later stage falls prey to an adversary that might examine the information learned during the protocol execution. The proof for the case of a semihonest, as we show in Section 3.4, is also sufficient for the case of linear polynomials, even if the receiver is malicious). Later we show how to provide privacy in the general case of malicious receivers. The proof that the sender's privacy is preserved against semi-honest receivers is identical for all protocols. The sender hides the polynomial P in a bivariate polynomial Q that is generated by adding a random polynomial of x, and the receiver obtains a system of d R + 1 = d + 1 = kd P + 1 values of Q, using different x values. Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 state that the receiver learns only a single linear combination of the coefficients of P . In particular this implies that a semi-honest receiver learns only a single value of the polynomial P (since following the protocol ensures that she learns linear combinations corresponding to values of Q).
Lemma 3.2 Let Q(x, y) be a bivariate polynomial of the form
Then for any d + 1 values x 1 , . . . , x d+1 , which are distinct and different from 0, and for any d + 1 values y 1 , . . . , y d+1 , the distribution of {Q(x j , y j )} d+1 j=1 is either independent of the coefficients b 0 , . . . , b d P , or depends on a single linear equation of these coefficients.
Proof: The values of Q(x j , y j ) are equations of the form Q(
They correspond, therefore, to a set of d + 1 equations of the following form, with different x j 's.
It should be shown that regardless of the values of the points (x j , y j ), the rows of the matrix A do not span more than a single linear combination of the vectors
The matrix A has d + d P + 1 columns and d + 1 rows. Consider the matrix A with d + d P + 1 rows that is formed by taking the first d rows of A and appending to them the vectors e d+1 , . . . , e d+dp+1 . The determinant of A is different from 0, since its upper-left sub-matrix of size d × d is a van der Monde matrix, and the lower-right sub-matrix of size (d p + 1) × (d p + 1) is a identity matrix. Therefore, the first d rows of A do not span any of e d+1 , . . . , e d+dp+1 , and the matrix A that has just a single additional row cannot span more than a single linear combination of these vectors. 2
Corollary 3.1 A semi-honest receiver learns only a single value of the polynomial P .
Security Against Malicious Behavior
As described in Section 3.3.1, we should only consider a semi-honest server since the only message sent by the receiver is sent before it receives any information from the server. On the other hand, a malicious adversary that plays the receiver's role might run the protocol and ask to learn values Q(x, y) that do not correspond to a polynomial S(x), i.e., not of the form Q(x, S(x)). By doing so it might learn a linear combination of the coefficients of P which does not correspond to any value of P (x). Lemma 3.2 shows that the adversary can only learn a single such linear combination. This might be sufficient for some applications, but to conform to the "ideal model" security definition, or, in general, to security against malicious behavior, the protocol must limit the information that the receiver can learn to a linear combination corresponding to a value of the polynomial P . This is achieved by Protocol 3.4 that is described below.
Improved efficiency: Another advantage of Protocol 3.4 is that its computational overhead, as measured by the number of oblivious transfers that are executed, is independent of the degree of P , and is equal to the overhead of Protocols 3.2 and 3.3 for the case of a linear polynomial P . We first note that if the polynomial P is linear, then Protocols 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 allow the receiver to learn only a single value of P and no other information about the coefficients (regardless of whether the receiver is malicious or not). We prove this for Protocol 3.2.
Lemma 3.3 When P is linear, the only information that the receiver can learn in Protocol 3.2 is a single value of P (·).
Proof: Denote P (x) as P (x) = b 1 x + b 0 . Theorem 3.2 implies that the receiver can only learn a single linear combination of the form b 1 · γ 1 + b 0 · γ 0 , where the receiver knows γ 1 and γ 0 . If γ 0 = 0 then this is equivalent to the receiver learning
We next claim that the adversary cannot learn any combination in which the coefficient γ 0 is 0. Consider the matrix A used in the proof of Theorem 3. Using linearization to combat malicious receivers: Given Lemma 3.3 the major tool we use is a reduction from the OPE of a polynomial of degree z to z OPEs of linear polynomials, due to Gilboa [28] . The reduction is stated in the following lemma, which is proven at the end of this section.
Lemma 3.4 [28] For every polynomial P of degree z, there exist z linear polynomials P 1 , . . . , P z , such that an OPE of P can be reduced to a parallel execution of an OPE of each of P 1 , . . . , P z , where all the linear polynomials are evaluated at the same point.
We first describe Protocol 3.4 that uses this reduction to provide security against a malicious receiver. We then show that the privacy of the server is preserved and prove the lemma. Protocol 3.4 itself ensures that the receiver evaluates all linear polynomials at the same point. Furthermore, the overhead, in terms of oblivious transfers, is the same as that of a single OPE of a linear polynomial, since the choices of the receiver in the oblivious transfer invocations in all OPEs are the same, and therefore it is possible to use parallel executions of OPE as described in Section 3.2.4.
Protocol 3.4 (Oblivious polynomial evaluation secure against malicious receivers)
The sender's input is P and the receiver's input is a polynomial α. The protocol is composed of the following steps:
1. The sender generates the d P linear polynomials P 1 , . . . , P d P that are used for reducing the OPE of the polynomial P to d P OPEs of linear polynomials, by the method of Lemma 3.4.
2. The parties execute d P instances of OPE in which the receiver evaluates the linear polynomials P 1 , . . . , P d P at the point α, under the following constraints:
• The sender generates independent masking polynomials P x,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ d P , and consequently the resulting bivariate polynomials Q i (x, y) = P x,i (x) + P i (y), one for each of the d P OPEs. (Step 1 of Protocol 3.1.)
• The receiver generates a single polynomial S for use in all the OPEs (step 2 of Protocol 3.1). This step defines
), such that for each i it holds that R i (0) = P i (α).
• The receiver learns d R + 1 tuples of the form (x j , R 1 (x j ), . . . , R d P (x j )). These values enable it to interpolate R 1 (α), . . . , R d P (α) (Steps 3 and 4 of Protocol 3.1).
The implementation of this step is done by executing the same number of oblivious transfers as is required for a single OPE of a linear polynomial. In each OPE the sender sends to the receiver d P values of the polynomials, namely
3. The receiver uses P 1 (α), . . . , P d P (α) to compute P (α) by the method of Lemma 3.4.
It follows from Lemma 3.4 and from the correctness of Protocol 3.1 that this protocol is correct. Namely, that it enables the receiver to compute P (α) for every value α. As for efficiency, we measure the computation overhead by the number of oblivious transfers that are executed. The protocol requires the same number of oblivious transfers as is required by an OPE of a linear polynomial, regardless of the degree d P . 1 It is therefore more efficient computationally than a direct OPE of the d P degree polynomial P . The communication overhead is about d P + 1 times larger than that of the OPE of a linear polynomial.
Theorem 3.5 Protocol 3.4 is secure against malicious behavior
Proof: The receiver's privacy is an immediate corollary of the receiver's privacy in the linear OPE protocol, since the information that the receiver sends is the same as in a single OPE protocol where it asks to learn the value at α of a linear polynomial. The sender's privacy follows from Lemma 3.4 and from the sender's privacy (against malicious receivers) in the OPE that is used to evaluate the linear polynomials.
2 Proof of Lemma 3.4: The lemma follows from the following three claims.
Claim 3.1 For every polynomial P of degree z there exist z linear polynomials P 1 , . . . , P z , such that given P 1 (α), . . . , P z (α) it is possible to compute the value of P (α).
Proof of Claim 3.1: Denote the polynomial P as P (x) = z i=0 b i x i , where z denotes the degree of the polynomial. The Horner representation of this polynomial is the following:
The inner-most linear polynomial of the Horner representation is Q z (x) = b z x + b z−1 . Define the linear polynomial P z (x) = b z x + b z−1 − s m , where s z is a random value chosen by the server. Of course, it holds that P z (x) + s z = Q z (x). Suppose that the client learns the value P z (α) (say, by executing an OPE). Following this step, the client and server have two random shares, P z (α) and s z , that sum up to Q z (α). Now, the inner-most polynomial of degree two is the following:
, where s z−1 is randomly chosen by the server. Then,
Suppose now that the client learns P z−1 (α) (by executing an OPE). Now the parties know two random shares that sum up to Q z−1 (α): The client can compute the share P z (α) · α + P z−1 (α), and the server knows s z−1 .
In the general case, the inner polynomial of degree z − i can be represented:
The server chooses a random value s i and defines the linear polynomial
) and s i are two random shares, which can be computed by the client and the server respectively, and which sum up to Q i (α). This definition is used up to P 2 (x); for P 1 (x), the server defines P 1 (x) = s 2 · x + b 0 (without any random value m 1 ). We get that Q 1 (x) = P (x), and therefore
Claim 3.2 The computation of the z linear polynomials of Claim 3.4 can be done by z OPEs that are executed in parallel.
Proof of Claim 3.2: Note that the polynomials P 1 , . . . , P z do not depend on α. Therefore, the server can define them in advance (by defining the values s 2 , . . . , s z ). This enables the parties to execute z parallel invocations of OPE, in which the client computes P 1 (α), . . . , P z (α). At the end of this parallelized stage, the client is able to compute P (α) using Equation 1. It follows that for every α ∈ F, the client can compute P (α) upon learning P 1 (α), . . . , P z (α). If the parties use the OPE protocols described in this paper, then the z + 1 OPEs can be implemented with the client sending the same message in all invocations: the client queries using the same information as in a single OPE of a linear polynomial at the point α, and the server responds with the relevant answer for each of the z polynomials.
In order to prove that the only information about P that can be computed given P 1 (α), . . . , P z (α) is P (α) we use the following claim: Claim 3.3 Given P (α) it is possible to simulate the client's output in the z invocations of the OPE protocols. (Namely, The only information about P that can be computed given P 1 (α), . . . , P z (α) is P (α).)
Proof of Claim 3.3: To prove the claim we show that for every P, α , the vector P 2 (α), . . . , P z (α) is uniformly distributed in F z−1 given that s 2 , . . . , s z are uniformly distributed in F z−1 .
For every 2 ≤ i ≤ z, observe that we can write P i (α) = C i (P, α, s i+1 , . . . , s z ) − s i , where C i (P, α, s i+1 , . . . , s z ) is a function of the coefficients of P , of α, and of s i+1 , . . . , s z . The claim is proved by induction, showing that P i (α), . . . , P z (α) is random, with i going from z down to 2. The base case, i = z is clear. In every step, we observe that s i is used to define P i (α) but is not involved in defining P i+1 (α), . . . , P z (α), and therefore P i (α), . . . , P z (α) is random given that P i+1 (α), . . . , P z (α) is random. Now, recall Equation 1. P 1 (α) is well defined given α, P (α), and the values of P 2 (α), . . . , P z (α). Therefore to simulate the client's view we choose random values for P 2 (α), . . . , P z (α) and compute P 1 (α) according to Equation 1.
2
Note on oblivious transfer: The security provided by Protocol 3.4 depends on the security of the oblivious transfer protocol. Universally composable OT protocols obviously result in a secure OPE protocol, since the choices of the receiver in the invocations of the OT protocol define the a single point in which it can evaluate the polynomial. Invoking an information theoretic OT protocol results in an OPE protocol which provides information theoretic security for the sender. In this case the receiver cannot learn more than a single point of the polynomial, but it might not be possible to extract it. Finally, it is also possible to use OT protocols that provide computational security for the sender, in which the receiver's input is extractable if the OT invocations are done sequentially. In this case, however, the protocols must be invoked sequentially in order to enable to extract the receiver's input from the OPE protocol.
Applications of Oblivious Evaluation of Polynomials
There are two types of applications in which oblivious polynomial evaluation is useful. The first is where the receiver obtains a value from a k-wise independent space. For many applications such values are as good as truly random or pseudo-random values. The second type is where it is desired to preserve privacy in cryptographic protocols that require users to obtain a value of a polynomial held by the sender, without revealing the choice to the sender. We give examples of both types of applications below. We also give a short description of the use of the protocols of this paper for obliviously computing g P (x) , where P is a polynomial.
Obliviously Computing a Polynomial in the Exponent
In some scenarios it might be required to let the receiver compute the value of g P (x) , where g is a generator of some group, P is known to the sender and x is known to the receiver. This computation is likely to be useful for cryptographic protocols that are based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption [20] . All the protocols described in this paper can be readily applied for this computation. The only change is for the sender to provide the receiver with values of g R(x) = g Q(x,S(x)) , instead of values of R(x) = Q(x, S(x)). The receiver needs to interpolate these values to compute g R(0) = g P (α) . She can do so by computing
where the values
i=1 are the appropriate Lagrange coefficients.
Comparing Information Without Leaking It
Imagine two parties, A and B. Each of the parties holds a particular name (e.g. of a "suspect" from a small group of people). The two parties would like to check whether they both have the same input, under the condition that if the inputs are different they do not want to reveal any information about them (except for the fact that they are different).
The main obstacle in designing a protocol for this problem is that the domain of inputs, e.g. names, is probably small enough to enable a brute force search over all possible inputs. This problem was thoroughly discussed by Fagin, Naor, and Winkler [23] , with subsequent constructions by Crépeau and Salvail [17] .
To specify the function more accurately, if the parties' inputs are (α, β), respectively, then their outputs are (1, 1) if α = β, and (0, 0) otherwise. In the case of malicious parties we relax the requirement and say that while for α = β the outputs can be arbitrary (since a malicious party can always change its input), in the case of inputs α = β, the output of the honest party must be 0. I.e., the malicious party cannot convince it that the inputs are equal. Oblivious evaluation of linear polynomials can be used to construct a very simple solution to this problem.
Protocol 4.1 (Privacy preserving comparison of information)
• Input: Denote A's input as α and B's input as β.
• Party A generates a random linear polynomial P A (·).
• Party B generates a random linear polynomial P B (·).
• The parties execute the oblivious polynomial evaluation twice, switching roles.
-In the first invocation A obliviously learns a value of B's polynomial (she should choose to learn P B (α).)
-In the second invocation B obliviously learns a value of A's polynomial (he should choose to learn P A (β).)
• The parties compute and compare the two values, P A (α) + P B (α) (computed by A), and P A (β) + P B (β) (computed by B).
• If α = β then the two values are the same, otherwise they are different with probability 1/|F| (where F is the field over which the polynomial is defined).
For semi-honest parties, privacy is preserved since the parties compare values of the function P A (x) + P B (x) that has the following properties (which are trivial to prove):
• The function is pair-wise independent.
• Each party only computes P A (x) + P B (x) once.
• Each party computes P A (x) + P B (x) without revealing x to the other party.
In the case of malicious parties, the proof is simple if the protocol uses an OPE protocol which enables the extraction of the receiver's input. Namely, given a TTP (trusted third party) which computes the function in the ideal model, we can simulate the joint distribution of the malicious party and the output of the other party: Assume that Alice is malicious. We extract her input α from her invocations of the OPE protocol and provide α to the TTP. If the answer is 1 we continue the protocol by evaluating her polynomial at β = α, sending the value P A (α) + P B (α) to the comparison, and fixing Bob's output based on the result of the comparison. (Note that in the case of a malicious Bob, who computes a value of Alice's polynomial after letting her evaluate his, we cannot extract Bob's input before evaluating P B (). We can, however, execute the OPE of Bob's polynomial twice in the simulation, learn P B () completely, and then be able to compute any value of P B () and use it to provide the right value to the comparison.). If the answer of the TTP is 0 then we provide a random value to the comparison.
Note that even if the OPE uses an OT protocol which provides information theoretic security for the sender, but no extraction of the receiver's input, a malicious party can evaluate the honest party's polynomial in at most a single point. In this case, if the evaluation point does not match the input of the honest party, then with high probability the output of the protocol is 0. We don't know, however, how to extract the evaluation point. (It might even be possible that the malicious party has some computational representation of the other party's input, such that it can evaluate the OPE in the right point but does not have an explicit knowledge of the value of its input.) Application to passwords: This protocol can serve as a basis for a mutually authenticated key exchange based on (possibly weak) passwords. Consider a user who wishes to login to a remote server over an insecure network. She does not want to send her password in the clear, and is not even certain that the remote party is the required server. An additional problem is that the password might not have enough entropy and might therefore be susceptible to dictionary attacks. Assume that there is no PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), and that the user does not carry with her a public key of the remote server. There have been several initial solutions to this problem (see e.g. [6, 45] ), for which it seems a security proof must postulate the existence of a Random Oracle.
The most natural formulation of the scenario is as a "comparing information without leaking it" problem. If the right user contacts the right server they both should be "thinking" of the same password, and they can verify whether this is the case using Protocol 4.1. Therefore, if it is assumed that there is no active adversary, and that the only operation of the adversary is to listen to the communication between the two parties and then try to impersonate the user, then Protocol 4.1 can be used for password authentication. Furthermore, it can be used to generate a session key for the two parties, whose entropy does not depend on the entropy of the passwords.
In more detail, each of the parties, the user and the remote server, chooses a random linear polynomial and (obliviously) computes the sum of the two polynomials at x = password. They use the first half of the output for authentication and the second half as a session key.
If the adversary can also be active, i.e., change the communication sent between the two parties, then the above protocol is insufficient. Although the adversary cannot decrypt the messages sent between the parties (e.g. in the invocations of the oblivious transfer protocol), it can change them and cause the output of the oblivious transfer protocol to be different, but related, to its legitimate output. The adversary can use this feature to attack different invocations of the protocol that are being executed in parallel. Our protocol can serve as a basis for a protocol that prevents such attacks, which must address delicate issues such as the non-malleability [19] of the oblivious transfer protocols. Elaborate definitions and constructions of such protocols were given in subsequent work (see, e.g., [33, 53] ).
Anonymous Initialization for Metering
A scheme for efficient and secure metering of clients' visits to servers was suggested in [48] . This scheme involves clients which send requests to servers, and a trusted, off-line, audit authority. Servers prove to the audit authority that they fulfilled requests (e.g. served web pages) to a certain number of clients. On a very high level, the operation of the scheme is as follows:
• The audit authority generates a random bivariate polynomial P (x, y), where the degree of x is k − 1.
• Each client u receives from the audit authority initialization data, which contains a univariate polynomial P (u, ·).
• When u sends a request to a server S (e.g. visits its web site) it sends it the value P (u, S).
• After k requests of different clients, S can interpolate the value P (0, S) which serves as a proof for serving k requests.
A modification of this scheme described in [48] preserves the anonymity of clients towards servers. However, if the audit agency cooperates with a server S they are able to identify clients which access the server, since the audit agency knows which polynomial is owned by every client. Combining this scheme with oblivious polynomial evaluation enables the client to learn the initialization data from the audit agency without revealing to the agency which initialization value (i.e. polynomial) was learned by the client. If this method is employed, then even a coalition of the audit agency and a server is not able to link different requests by the same client.
Anonymous Coupons
Consider the following scenario. An organization wants to set up an anonymous complaint box for its personnel, but would like to ensure that each person complains at most once (for example, if there are ten complaints about the quality of the coffee machine, they should be from ten different people and not ten complaints of the same person). A solution for this problem is to give each person an anonymous coupon that he or she should attach to a submitted complaint. When a complaint is received the coupon is checked for validity and freshness, namely it is verified that it is a valid coupon that was not previously used. Anonymous coupons can be constructed using oblivious polynomial evaluation. 2 The coupon manager sets up a polynomial P of degree d. Each person A obtains a coupon by choosing a random secret value R A and obliviously computing P (R A ), using an oblivious polynomial evaluation protocol in which the coupon manager is the sender. The coupon is the pair R A , P (R A ) . It is easy for the coupon manager to verify that a coupon X, Y is valid, by simply testing whether Y = P (X). The coupon manager also keeps a list of the coupons that were received, and compares each new coupon to that list in order to verify that it was not used before.
The system is secure against a coalition of corrupt users that attempt to generate fake coupons, as long as the coalition has at most d different coupons. The degree of the polynomial, d, should therefore be set in accordance with the potential size of a corrupt coalition of users.
A corrupt coupon manager might attempt to identify the owners of coupons by using a different polynomial for each person. Namely, for every user A it might use a different polynomial P A for the oblivious evaluation protocol. When it later receives a coupon X, Y it attempts to identify its owner by checking for which polynomials P A it holds that Y = P A (X). Since users evaluate the polynomial at random points, this attack can be prevented by ensuring that the sender uses the same polynomial in all oblivious evaluation protocols, for example using the verifiable secret sharing techniques of Feldman [24] or Pedersen [55] .
